The political economy of social vulnerability. The social and political determinants of new social risks in western European countries by C.Ranci
1 
 
 
The future of the welfare state: paths of social policy innovation 
between constraints and opportunities 
Urbino, 17-19 September 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
The political economy of social vulnerability.  
The social and political determinants of new social risks in western European countries 
 
 
 
Costanzo Ranci (*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the 7th ESPAnet conference 2009 
Session: nr. 10B Poverty risks and social policy programmes in the 21st century 
 
 
 
 
 
(*) Polytechnic of Milan - DIAP 
Via Bonardi 3 20133 Milano, Italy 
costanzo.ranci@polimi.it 
2 
 
 
Introduction  
The so-called ‘European social mode’” was founded for many decades on a close association 
between permanent employment, stability in the division of roles within the nuclear family and the 
progressive extension of welfare guarantees. All these conditions seem currently to be lacking 
because of the greater job insecurity and the consequent discontinuity in incomes, the organisational 
tensions taking place in the family and the substantial inertia of European welfare systems. Taken 
together these transformations and inaction cause a spreading situation of social vulnerability in the 
population 
This paper1 is primarily aimed at describing the dimensions and characteristics of social 
vulnerability in Western Europe. Although the literature on ‘new social risks’ is now quite broad, 
there is so far no analysis which shows the actual diffusion and intensity of such risks. It was my 
purpose to fill this gap by taking the paradigm of ‘new social risks’ as a hypothesis to be verified 
through an empirical analysis that covers a broad spectrum of aspects. 
The central notion of the paper is social vulnerability. Differently from the notion of poverty, it 
includes aspects that are not connected exclusively with income level, but also with housing 
conditions, employment, the management of care for children and dependent persons, the model of 
family organisation, the difficulties arising in the transition through different phases of the life 
course. It concerns not individuals facing severe hardship or social exclusion but people who are 
permanently exposed to instability and weak integration into society.  
The objective of the paper is to show to what extent the emerging risks in post-industrial societies 
are contributing to compromise the normal functioning of a substantial proportion of the Western 
European population: how material survival and the standard of living attained are or are not 
guaranteed, how the principal changes in the life-course are well or badly managed, how care for 
children and the elderly is provided.  
The analysis maintains a comparative purpose: the objective is in fact to identify the different 
profiles of vulnerability that exist in a number of different ‘macro-regions’ which make up Western 
Europe. Since these profiles depend on a complex set of social, economical and institutional 
characteristics, one of the main contributions of the paper is to develop comparisons on a sub-
national scale, starting with the identification of 28 ‘macro-regions’ identified through analysis of 
the social and economic characteristics of the different areas of which Western Europe is composed.  
The paper in structured in five parts. 
                                                           
1
 This paper is anticipating some results and analysis included in Ranci C. (ed.), Social vulnerability in Europe. The new 
configuration of social risks in Western Europe, Basingstoke, Palgrave McMillan, forthcoming. 
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Part 1 illustrates the principal hypotheses, by looking at the changes that have occurred in the last 
ten years in Western Europe and their effects on the risk profile of the population. Five new 
phenomena are identified: the diffusion of income instability, the rise of a new kind of housing 
deprivation, the growth in temporary work, the difficulties in reconciling caring and working and 
the explosion of a dependent population determined by the ageing population. In part 2 the notion 
of social vulnerability is then introduced and its connection with the concepts of ‘new social risk’ 
and poverty is explained. In part 3 the different dimensions of vulnerability are considered in the 
way they combine and in how they are composed to identify complex and diversified profiles of 
vulnerability. Part 4 attempts to verify to what extent the vulnerability profiles previously identified 
are influenced in their extent and distribution by a plurality of social, economic and institutional 
factors. Finally, in part 5  the possible policy implications of such results are illustrated. 
 
1. The new social risks 
 
The so-called ‘European social model’, which has characterized the development of industrial 
societies since the postwar period, has rested on three basic foundations (with the partial exception 
of Scandinavian countries where the transition to post-industrial society occurred much earlier): 
high employment stability, broad and generous welfare programmes, the persistence of strong 
family ties based on a gender division of roles. The development of welfare systems has made a 
substantial contribution to the bond between the dominant organisational model in the sphere of 
production and the pattern dominating in the family sphere, offering protection against what has 
been considered the most serious social risk: losing a job (Esping Andersen, 1999).  
In the course of a few decades, the three foundations (work, family and welfare) on which postwar 
European societies rested have progressively lost their capacity to provide for the well-being and 
security of many citizens. According to Esping-Andersen, these institutions are today the principal 
sources of danger (1999). Those threatened are both citizens at the extremes of the age bands 
(children, the elderly) and the middle class. It is a process that has been defined as a progressive 
erosion of intermediate positions (Castel, 1995).  
The first form of erosion regards the organisation of work. The fundamental break with the 
industrial wage-earner model lies in the weakening of the labour market to function as the principal 
mechanism of social integration. It is the increased job insecurity that lies at the origin of this 
process, founding working relationships not on skills made continuously available, but on the 
immediate performance of specific tasks. There is nothing marginal in this trend: increasing job 
insecurity is a mainstream process, determined by the new technological and economic demands 
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connected with the evolution of modern capitalism. According to Castel (1995) increasing 
insecurity consists of three processes: the destabilisation of workers who were previously stable, 
which lowers their living standards; the growth of a large mass of long-term unemployed; and the 
creation of a ‘supernumerary’ population of persons who are permanently excluded from the labour 
market. Even in countries where the silent revolution of work is not generating great 
unemployment, it is nevertheless undeniable that we are now a long way from the ‘wage-earner 
society’ which characterized western Europe until the 1990s.  
The second form of erosion consists of the gradual weakening of kinship support networks as a 
consequence of new demographical trends and of the reorganisation of households. New forms of 
households have developed, while established family models have experienced profound internal 
re-organisation. Single person households and single parent households have become common. 
Male breadwinner families have become increasingly less numerous because of the progressive 
increase in female employment. At the same time, new types of household are emerging where 
adult children remain in their parents’ home long after they have reached economic independence. 
While on the one hand these phenomena are a sign of the progressive individualisation of social 
life, on the other hand they compromise the family capacity of collecting and redistributing 
resources to the benefit of its weakest members: children, the elderly, people unable to work. The 
functioning of families faced with the difficult task of reconciling different duties is in fact being 
heavily overloaded. 
There is a strong contrast between these changes and the great rigidity of welfare systems. They are 
undergoing a third process of erosion. Welfare systems have remained trapped in a model that is no 
longer in harmony with the emerging risk profiles in European societies (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). The 
social protection systems existing in many European countries offer an extensive social protection 
only to citizens who are fully integrated in the labour market. Hit by the fiscal crisis of the welfare 
state, and as a consequence of the changes in the labour market, today this protection is granted to a 
smaller proportion of citizens and with less generosity than in the past. However, what is even more 
important is that at the same time new risk profiles are emerging for which the existing welfare state 
is not organized to provide an adequate response (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Therefore the welfare 
state requires a general rethinking of its financial and organisational architecture if new risk profiles 
are to be adequately protected.  
While protection against risks was guaranteed in postwar society by the association between secure 
jobs, a stable division of roles within the nuclear family and a progressive extension of the 
guarantees furnished by the welfare state, today new risks are arising precisely where job insecurity, 
income instability, increasing fragility of family support and inertia of welfare institutions intersect.  
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Five principal critical problems can be identified. 
 
The first concerns the spread of ‘integrated poverty’ (Paugam, 1997), which includes a large group 
of European citizens who temporarily or sporadically face a situation of relative poverty. An area of 
‘transient poverty’ or ‘recurrent poverty’ (Layte and Fouarge, 2004) which affects a total of 20-25 
per cent of the population in European countries (according to ECHP data), with peaks in southern 
Europe and in the UK and lower levels in continental Europe and Scandinavian countries. Layte and 
Fouarge (2004; see also Layte and Whelan, 2005) show that people affected by temporary poverty 
are much more than people in a condition of persistent poverty. Our data confirm the same fact (see 
Figure 1), indicating that cumulated poverty is less diffuse than financial fragility and income 
instability.  
 
Figure 1. Share of families in temporary, recurrent, or permanent poverty – 1995-2001 
 
 
Source: ECHP data, autor’s own elaboration 
 
What therefore emerges is a very broad area of income instability in Europe. Nearness to the 
poverty line and crossing it at times, this situation does not necessarily determine a drop into 
permanent poverty. Income instability indicates a condition of life characterized by strong 
economic stress and by a marked reduction in the standard of living that is accompanied by an 
uncertain financial position. This condition of fragility increases the probability of social exclusion 
when negative events occur (illness, unemployment, family breakups, etc.). Moreover, it constitutes 
in itself a condition of difficulty which has effect on life conditions.  
 
A second problem concerns the diffusion of housing deprivation related to affordability difficulties 
or housing inadequacy: situations which expose people to social instability and financial strain, 
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which do not translate directly nor necessarily into severe hardship or homelessness. Western 
European countries have seen a great improvement in the housing conditions of their citizens in the 
last three decades. About three quarters of the Western European population owns today the house 
where they live. Even traditional difficulties, such as overcrowding, have been partially overcome. 
Quite paradoxically, however, this growth has come with increasing tensions and difficulties, 
mainly due to rising housing costs and changes in the housing market. The co-presence of these two 
phenomena - increased home-ownership and higher housing costs – has made the access to a 
dwelling much more difficult for some sections of the population. The paradoxical finding is 
therefore that in Europe (and especially in some areas of it) relative housing deprivation has grown. 
According to our data European people who experiment at least one condition of housing 
deprivation are between five and eight per cent of the total, with marked geographical differences 
(see Figure 2). Today access to housing constitutes one of the harshest difficulties met by the youth 
in their transition towards adulthood, especially in metropolitan areas. The huge costs of accessing 
housing contribute not only to compress the living standards of households, but also to delay life-
projects and depress expectations for the future.  
 
Figure 2  Share of families dealing with housing deprivation, by geographical areas - 2001 
 
 
Source: ECHP data, autor’s own elaboration 
 
A third problem concerns the spread of jobs and careers in which work is insecure and temporary. 
Temporary employees over 25 years of age in the EU15 as a percentage of total workers rose from 
eight per cent in 1996 to 11 per cent in 2006. The current percentage for women is 12 per cent. In 
recent years the percentage of temporary workers has exceeded the rate of the unemployed, which 
has fallen from ten per cent in 1996 to seven per cent in 2006 (see Figure 3). This happened in most 
European countries except for continental countries in the German area and for the UK and Ireland.  
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Figure 3 Share of temporary workers and unemployed workers 1983-2006 in EU15 
 
 
Source: Eurostat statistics 2007 
 
The diffusion of temporary work has been considered as a factor increasing the risk of acquiring a 
lower wage, of becoming trapped in jobs which are constantly insecure, and of exclusion from the 
labour market. These risks appear to be particularly high for workers with low levels of education 
and few occupational skills. As a consequence of the progressive increase in the level of education 
of workers over the last decade, a reduction in the relative amount of temporary workers with low 
education (down from 39 per cent to 33 per cent between 1996 and 2005 in the EU15) has occurred. 
In the same period job insecurity has become more frequent both in the low-waged service industry 
and in highly skilled and very professionalized industries, contributing therefore to the polarization 
of the labour market and affecting social groups that were traditionally considered protected against 
the risks of temporary employment.  
Temporary employment increases not only the risk of impoverishment, but also the general living 
conditions of workers. This situation is not only affecting the young population, but also, and 
increasingly, the adult population: only 34 per cent of people in insecure jobs in the EU15 are under 
24, while 41 per cent are between 25 and 39 years of age. The probability that a young person under 
24 years had a temporary job was 34 per cent in 1996 and over ten years it has increased by 20 per 
cent to reach 41 per cent. In the population between 24 and 39 years old the growth of temporary 
workers was 34 per cent in ten years (from 16 to 21 per cent). A progressive shift in job insecurity 
beyond the phase of access to the labour market, as well as a progressive extension of job insecurity 
over a longer period of careers, have therefore taken place in the last decade.  
As job insecurity spreads in the population between 30 and 40 years of age, the tendency of the 
young generations to remain economically dependent on their family of origin and to postpone 
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projects for autonomy also increases. Studies also show that job flexibility for women correlates 
negatively with fertility rates. 
 
The fourth critical area is reconciliation of working and childcaring. The diffusion of this problem 
depends on the constant increase in female employment and the growing importance for families to 
have two earners to maintain a satisfactory income. The female activity rate has increased in EU15 
countries by ten per cent over the last decade and in 2006 reached 63 per cent of the total female 
population in working age. The gender gap has narrowed in the same period by a third (from -23 
per cent to -16 per cent). The most evident consequence of the increased female participation in the 
labour market is the spread of dual earner households and the parallel reduction in traditional male 
breadwinner households. This nevertheless triggers strong tensions around reconciling working 
with childcaring.  
If only the period of life in which maternity and work activity most easily coincide (25-49 years) is 
considered, the gender gap is around 15 per cent in the EU15 (with two exceptions: it falls below 
ten per cent in Scandinavian countries and increases by more than 20 per cent in Southern European 
countries). Most of this gap (approximately two thirds according to EUROSTAT data) is 
determined by the parallel assumption of family responsibilities. The presence of children in 
preschool age (1-5 years) pushes the female activity rate down further: the activity rate falls by 
eight per cent in the EU15 for women with one child, by 14 per cent for women with two children 
and by 30 per cent for women with three or more children (see Figure 4). The higher gender gap for 
women with children is caused not only by mothers working less frequently, but also by relative 
fathers working more frequently than their peers without children. Therefore, while the female 
activity rate of women between 25 and 50 years old has increased continuously in recent years in all 
the EU15 countries (one point more for year), the gap between activity rates for women with 
children and women without children has narrowed only in some countries (in the UK, Spain and 
France, but not in Italy and Germany) and at a rate that is in any case very low (only two per cent in 
ten years).  
 
 
Figure 4  
Female activity rates for women aged 25-49 years old by number of children 1995-2005 in EU15 
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Source: Eurostat statistics 2007 
 
The constant increase in female participation in the labour market is making the risk of not 
reconciling working and childcaring more common. It is a problem which has negative effects not 
only on female employment and gender inequalities on the labour market, but also on two other 
aspects: on the exposure of families with small children to the risk of poverty and on the increasing 
demographic unbalance of the European population. Problems of reconciliation are therefore to be 
considered in relation not exclusively to gender opportunities, but also to the diffusion of other 
social problems.  
 
The last critical area concerns the living conditions of the elderly. The most important implication 
concerns the increase in the number of dependent persons who require long term care assistance. 
Dependency is destined in future to become more common as a result of life expectancy becoming 
progressively longer. Furthermore it will be concentrated increasingly in the population over 80 years. 
There were approximately 17 million persons over this age in the EU15 population in 2007 accounting 
for 4.5 per cent of the population. The absolute quantity is nevertheless destined to increase rapidly, 
partly as a result of the entrance of more numerous cohorts in this age. While the overall population 
will remain stable, the population over 80 years is destined to increase by about three per cent per year, 
doubling in approximately 30 years, accounting for seven per cent of the total population in 2025 (see 
Figure 5). Even if the percentage of dependency will be lower than at present, it is calculated that the 
dependent population will in any case increase exponentially in the next decades (Jacobzone, 1999). 
The family constitutes the primary care resource for dependent persons in all European countries. 
Oesterle (2001) estimates that informal care covers around three quarters of total care for the disabled 
in western European countries: it is a percentage which attributes a very secondary role to public 
protection. In addition to the disparities between poor and rich determined by the residual nature of the 
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public provision of long-term-care, new problems are emerging because of a progressive reduction in 
the informal care provided by families.  
Figure 5 Proportion of people aged 65-79 years and aged 80 years and more, 1977-2008 in EU15 
 
Source: Eurostat statistics 2007 
 
The reasons of this fact are various. Firstly, the transformations in the forms of households, connected 
with the growing individualisation of social life, help to increase the demand for care which cannot be 
satisfied by members of the same household: the numbers of elderly living alone are in fact increasing 
in all European countries, while the numbers of the elderly living with their children are decreasing. 
For example 55 per cent of persons over 80 years live alone in the UK, 60 per cent in Germany and 42 
per cent in Italy. All countries show an increase in the elderly living alone.  
This is set against a progressive decrease in the potential for support from kinship networks. This is 
determined primarily by the worsening of the old age dependency ratio (the statistic currently varies 
between 25 and 28 per cent depending on the country) as a consequence of the reduction in the effect 
of the generation turnover. The rise of the elderly in a situation where the adult population remains 
stable has therefore the effect of increasing the caring load on families. Furthermore, the progressive 
reduction in the number of children per woman (which fell from 2.4 children for women born in the 
1930s to 1.8 children for women born in the 1960s) is reducing the availability of family caregivers. 
Europe is destined to become the area of the world where the potential for support from kinship 
networks is most reduced.  
A second factor which is weakening the caregiving capacity of informal networks is the increase in 
female participation in the labour market in context where no significant advances have taken place in 
public homecare services. The effects of higher female employment on informal care for the elderly 
are not clear. According to a report on caregiving in six European countries (Lamura et al., 2003) the 
increase in female employment rates is not significantly reducing caregiving activity when this is for a 
few hours per week, while it has an appreciable effect on caregiving to persons who require continuous 
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assistance, making home care or institutionalisation necessary. Generally, while there is uncertainty 
over the decline in the number of informal caregivers, it is likely that the total time spent on caregiving 
is decreasing.  
 
2.  From risk to vulnerability  
 
In industrial societies it was recognized that conditions like unemployment or illness did not depend 
on individual responsibility, but on factors beyond the control of the individual with important 
negative consequences for the whole society. Since the fundamental element of protection was 
provided by work, the events which for various reasons prevented a person from working - 
sickness, accident, unemployment and old age - assumed the status of a ‘social risk’ and involved 
recognition of the right to public protection. Because these negative events and their frequency were 
clearly identifiable, they could be analysed, predicted and protected through insurance mechanisms.  
In the most recent decades the changes previously mentioned caused the progressive appearance of 
‘new social risks’. According to Taylor-Gooby (2004), these risks are new in two senses: on the one 
hand they are spreading progressively, even if they were already present in industrial societies, 
while on the other hand it was not until recent years that their social, rather than their individual 
dimension, has been recognized. However, the characteristics of these new risks are actually so 
different from the ‘old social risks’ that they require a redefinition of the notion of social risk itself 
if they are to be properly recognized.  
 
In risk analysis risk is defined as the possibility of experiencing a negative outcome or a significant 
damage as a consequence of one (or more) factors (called ‘risk factors’). The negative outcome 
clearly identified in industrial societies was the loss of a permanent job and, as a consequence, the 
chance to receive a secure wage. Social protection against this risk was basically aimed at 
reintegrating the income which was not guaranteed by an employment position.  
However, as the cases previously illustrated show, a broad part of the present population is exposed 
to negative outcomes which do not primarily consist in the loss of a job. New social risks concern a 
much broader spectrum of negative outcomes which cannot be reduced to the loss of a job and a 
wage. Rather than on the position in the labour market, the new risks depend on the difficult 
connections between labour market, household organisation and public welfare.  
As a consequence, while ‘old social risks’ were connected mostly with middle or old age, most of 
the new social risks affect persons at the start of their life cycle. They are primarily related to the 
difficulty of finding a stable position in the labour market and/or assuming caregiving 
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responsibilities in the initial phases of family life. While old social risks are mostly related to 
income problems, new social risks, even when they regard problems of health and ageing as in the 
case of dependency, do not affect only personal incomes, but also more complex aspects such as 
housing conditions, solitude and isolation, the integrity of relations between generations and the 
reorganisation of families around caregiving activities. Even new risks arising on the labour market, 
such as job insecurity, affect more complex aspects than income, such as the possibility to make 
investments in training and careers, co-operation between family members with different positions 
on the labour market and the support provided by previous generations to the next ones.  
 
A second peculiarity of new social risks is that the relationship between causes and negative 
outcomes is complex and multidimensional. The causes which triggered negative outcomes in 
industrial societies were clearly identified. They brought down to four basic factors around which 
the main mechanisms of social protection were constructed: sickness, old age, adult disability and 
unemployment. The relationship between risk factors and negative outcomes was clear because the 
labour market was the main mechanism for the distribution of social resources and risks were 
therefore identified in the points where the labour market malfunctioned.  
In post-industrial societies individuals participate in the distribution of resources through a number 
of different channels. A very high percentage of the income of individuals comes from participation 
in the distribution of public resources. Welfare systems have gradually broadened the range of their 
beneficiaries beyond the social group of workers and have introduced mechanisms for the 
distribution of resources which are to a large extent independent of rules which apply in the labour 
market (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The ageing of the population is also increasing the percentage of 
people which owe their material survival to public programs for the distribution of resources. 
Moreover, changes in the labour market and the increase in temporary employment have weakened 
the social protection mechanisms grounded on the occupational position of people.  
As the material conditions of people today depend on a number of different social mechanisms, then 
there are a number of different possible negative outcomes which are difficult to correlate with 
specific causes. This explains why the social impact of risk factors, such as disability, can differ 
considerably. Since people participate simultaneously in a number of different resource distribution 
systems, compensatory mechanisms often come into play making it possible to rely on a large range 
of resources when a difficulty arises. Social situations in which a number of negative outcomes 
accumulate are very limited, as is shown by the statistics already reported on the diffusion of 
poverty in Europe, while situations in which both negative outcomes and compensatory 
mechanisms are joined are much more common.  
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As a consequence of this fact, new social risks basically arise from the difficulty in co-ordinating 
the different mechanisms of resource distribution. For example, the problem of reconciling caring 
and working emerges from the difficulty in co-ordinating labour market rules with family 
organisation. Social problems related to dependency often arise from difficulties in combining 
family support and welfare benefits. Multiple participation in a plurality of resource distribution 
systems creates problems of co-ordination among systems that follow very different logic and 
regulation.  
The basic social organisation which most has guaranteed this co-ordination has been the family, 
founded on a gendered division of roles which has facilitated the task of dealing with various social 
risks. In many situations today, however, the re-organisation of families which is in progress makes 
combined management of different problems more difficult. This causes greater exposure of 
individuals to the negative outcomes produced by specific risk factors. It is on this aspect that the 
inadequacy of the traditional notion of social risk is found. In a system characterized by the 
participation of individuals in a number of different resource distribution mechanisms, the degree of 
the negative outcomes does not depend only on specific risk factors, but also on the functioning of a 
plurality of the resource distribution mechanisms and the capacity of individuals to organize and 
manage complex situations. Some individuals and some families are more exposed than others to 
greater damage as a consequence of the same risk factor. Disability puts some individuals more into 
difficulty than others. Temporary work has negative outcomes for some worker and not for others, 
as well as temporary poverty implies the passage to a condition of permanent poverty for some 
people, while for many others it constitutes only a provisional condition.  
Risk analysis has introduced the concept of vulnerability to explain how the effect of the same risk 
factor can be different for equally exposed individuals. According to Vatsa (2004), vulnerability 
explains the distribution of a negative outcome on a population in relation not to the cause (the risk 
factor) which determined it, but to the greater or lesser exposure of the population to suffer the 
consequences of this cause. In other words, vulnerability identifies a situation that is characterized 
by a state of weakness which exposes a person (or a family) to suffer particularly negative or 
damaging consequences if a problematic situation arises. Vulnerability does not necessarily identify 
trajectories of impoverishment or social exclusion, but rather a high degree of exposure to serious 
damage: dependent persons may suffer severe impoverishment if they are alone or have no access 
to care services; temporary workers may suffer serious damage if they become sick; a temporarily 
poor family may fall into a condition of permanent poverty if a member of the family loses him/her 
job, or if a child is born which obliges the woman to stop working. Social risk in contemporary 
societies therefore includes two aspects: hazard (the probability that a potential negative situation 
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occurs) and vulnerability (the degree of exposure to damage that may result from the situation). The 
more the risk factors diversify and the more difficult it becomes to predict the negative outcomes, 
the more central the dimension of vulnerability becomes in understanding the areas of social 
disadvantage.  
 
New social risks present finally a third characteristic. Old social risks consist of a well-defined 
range of events considered as ‘damaging’ or undesired with relative certainty. Exposure to these 
risks identifies precisely how near individuals are from events that are identified and classified as 
potentially dangerous. The definition of a risk coefficient corresponds to the attribution of a precise 
social identification: any person is either ‘normal’, or ‘at risk’, or alternatively in a situation of 
evident hardship (when the damaging event has occurred). Since the ‘old risks’ concern individuals 
in the labour market, it is clear that the exposure of individuals depends crucially on their position 
in the class system.  
The same operation seems more difficult to perform for new social risks. In fact it is precisely 
instability that is the peculiar trait in the critical situations we have identified. Consider the 
examples of temporary workers, people hit by chronic invalidity, families floating above and below 
the poverty line. They are situations characterized by few social guarantees, by instability in the 
fundamental mechanisms for acquiring resources and by the fragility of social and family relations. 
What they have in common is that their position within the main systems of social integration 
(work, family, the welfare system) is characterized by incertainty.  The effect of social class on 
these positions appears difficult to assess and will be verified empirically further on.  
It is from the instability of the social position occupied that the notion of vulnerability draws its 
relevance. Exposure to the risk of serious negative outcomes depends not only on class position, but 
also on a broad set of situations where a person fluctuates in the social structure (Castel 1995). 
Fluctuation occurs in various ways: horizontal mobility between different jobs, flexibility in work 
and family roles, uncertainty over the position occupied, absence of welfare guarantees, difficulty in 
reconciling and co-ordinating different roles and responsibilities. While on the one hand the 
fluctuation opens up the possibility for many individuals of ‘building their own biography’ (Beck, 
1992), on the other hand it contributes to social instability and difficulties in being independent.  
 
To summarize, the notion of social vulnerability not only identifies specific risk profiles, but also 
the nature of the risks themselves. They have shifted from situations in which the relationship 
between causes and negative outcomes was clearly identifiable into conditions characterized by 
unforeseeable varying degrees of exposure to possible damages depending on a complex set of risk 
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factors. They have changed from situations that were clearly identifiable by observing the 
employment position of individuals to situations which are characterized by a multiplicity of 
distribution resource mechanisms. Finally they have transformed from relatively stable situations 
into situations characterized by uncertainty.  
The spread of new social risks is therefore bringing out the importance of social vulnerability. This 
is characterized by an uncertain access to  fundamental material resources (a wage, welfare 
benefits) and/or by the fragility of the family and community social networks. It is characterized not 
only by a resources deficit, but also by an exposure to social disorganization which reaches such a 
critical level to put the stability of everyday life in danger. It takes the form of a life situation in 
which autonomy and the capacity of individuals and families for self determination are threatened 
by the introduction of uncertainty into the main systems of social integration. The instability of the 
social position attained does in fact translate into a reduction of opportunities in life and of 
possibilities to choose. It is characterized not so much by the scarcity of resources tout court, as by 
the instability of the mechanisms used to obtain them.  
 
3. The dimensions of social vulnerability in Western Europe 
Our data show that the European population is marked by a wide range of vulnerability factors. 
Only in extreme situations are these factors sufficiently strong to produce a situation of social 
exclusion or severe material deprivation. One specific risk, in fact, may be balanced by a good 
position along the other dimensions of social vulnerability. It is therefore not only the severity of 
the risk itself, but also the cumulation or combination of several risks, which determines the degree 
of social vulnerability. Hence social vulnerability takes the form of a situation characterized by 
serious deficits on one or more dimensions of social risk.  
What are the relations among the various social risks? To what extent do they cumulate or 
compensate for each other? The analysis that follows highlights a perhaps unexpected finding: there 
are scant overlaps among the different dimensions of vulnerability considered. 
A synthetic index of vulnerability was considered by assembling the numerous dimensions of social 
vulnerability (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 Multidimensional index of social vulnerability 
    Households    Individuals 
   
Non- vulnerable 52.1 49.4 
Income vulnerability 8.7 7.0 
Work vulnerability 8.1 9.4 
Housing vulnerability 5.1 6.9 
Dependence with severe material 
compression 
2.7 2.6 
No reconciliation of work and 
childcare 
2.9 3.2 
low multi-vulnerability i 8.8 11.0 
high multi-vulnerability ii 3.5 4.0 
severe hardship iii 8 6.4 
      
Total 100 100.0 
Source: ECHP data, autor’s own elaboration 
  Notes: 
i. This category comprises situations with more than one element of vulnerability but an 
overall score no higher than three.  
ii. This category comprises situations with more than one element of vulnerability but 
an overall score no higher than three. 
iii. This category comprises situations characterized by one or more element of vulnerability scored 
three points. 
 
The following three areas of vulnerability with very different characteristics emerge from Table 1.  
1. The first area is characterized by moderate vulnerability, that is the presence of households that 
are vulnerable on only one dimension and compensate their exposure to a single risk with other 
more favourable factors. 28 per cent of households are in this situation. This slight form of 
vulnerability is distributed across all the dimensions of vulnerability considered. 
2. The second area – multiple -vulnerability – is characterized by the presence of interweavings 
among several risk factors, but without a marked cumulation of disadvantages. The households 
in this area are exposed to two or more risk factors, but without this giving rise to severe 
deprivation. The area therefore identifies a situation of social vulnerability which derives from a 
very wide range of dimensions. This area comprises 12.3 per cent of European households. 
3. The third area – severe hardship – is characterized by the presence of one or more very high risk 
factors: all members of the household are unemployed workers, chronic poverty for at least four 
years in a five years time-span, severely substandard housing, high care needs in the households 
creating a deep material compression, no conciliation between working and childcaring as one 
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of the parents looks after her/his child/children and is looking for work at the same time. The 
presence of one or more of these factors heavily penalize the household’s standard of living. 
Eight per cent of households are included in this group.  
 
It therefore emerges from this analysis that around half (52 per cent) of European households are 
not affected by any risk factor and can therefore be considered as ‘non-vulnerable’, whilst 
households which exceed a threshold of serious vulnerability – characterized by the presence of at 
least one severe hardship condition – represent eight per cent of the total. Between these two 
extremes lie 40 per cent of households, which are exposed (with different intensity and extension) 
to one or more of the risk factors considered. Around half of European households, therefore, are 
not affected by any of the social risks considered. All the other households experience difficulties, 
but they assume the character of severe deprivation for only one household in every eight cases. 
Vulnerability is therefore distributed across a very broad population. Only in a small number of 
cases is there a cumulative effect which pushes a minority of this vulnerable population into a 
situation of severe hardship. 
 
Thus delineated is a social area that coincides neither with households with normal living standards 
nor with households overloaded with deficits. It is a social area which more than the others is 
structurally affected by the economic cycle, by trends in the housing market and changes in welfare 
policies, and which presents weaknesses that, in adverse situations, may generate more severe 
hardships. Economic and financial crisis may in fact have a strong impact on this population, 
worsening the material conditions of these households, weakening their capacity to deal with 
difficult situations, and exposing them to a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion. But even in 
ordinary situations moderate exposure to social vulnerability generates insecurity as consequence of 
the uncertain access to crucial resources (employment, income, housing) or difficulties in 
combining resources (care responsibility with material sustainability): a weakened social integration 
that constitutes a problematic situation in itself and not only a factor responsible for a possible 
deteriorated social position.  
 
Significant macro-area differences repeatedly emerged during the analysis. This is an aspect almost 
taken for granted in a continent historically marked by different historical and social milieus. 
Vulnerability does not significantly overcome the 35 per cent threshold in Belgium, Denmark and 
Finland, as well as the metropolitan area of Paris. It exceeds 40 per cent in Portugal, Greece, 
Southern Italy, and Spain. Around 30 per cent of the overall vulnerable population in Western 
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Europe resides in the macro-areas of Southern Europe, excluding Northwest and Central-Eastern 
Italy, and central-eastern Spain. Also concentrated in Southern Europe is 39 per cent of the 
population with severe vulnerability. 
 
Three salient findings emerge from the analysis. 
Firstly, there is a central European area characterized by high standards of well-being and social 
security and which comprises the Scandinavian countries and the Northern area of continental 
Europe, as well as the metropolitan regions of Paris and London. This area concentrates not only the 
greatest well-being but also the highest degree of protection against new social risks.  
Secondly, this analysis confirms the existence of a marked dualism between Northern and Southern 
Europe. The analysis shows that social distress in these areas does not exclusively, nor even 
principally, concern the risk of poverty but rather a stronger interweaving among exposure to 
poverty, housing risk, and precarious employment. By contrast, the richest area of Europe has very 
low indexes of vulnerability: they comprise fully two thirds of the population that is free from any 
sort of vulnerability. 
Finally, the diffusion of social vulnerability does not reproduce the standard taxonomy of three or 
four welfare regimes in Western Europe. There are several incongruities. In Northern Europe, an 
area of substantial freedom from the new social risks cuts across the traditional distinctions among 
welfare systems. This includes not only Scandinavian countries but also a broad Northern area that 
extends from the great metropolitan areas of Paris and London to the small countries facing onto the 
North Sea: Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. And it includes also Germany and Austria. 
What groups these areas together is more their level of wellbeing and socio-economic development 
than the kind of welfare regimes. In Southern Europe some macro-areas – notably North-West and 
Centre-East Italy – are closer to the centre of Europe than to other Southern areas. Moreover, not 
surprisingly Spain and Italy show huge macro-regional disparities in the exposure of population to 
social risks. If the North-South divide is still relevant in Western Europe, more specific divisions 
cut across these two parts of the continent, driving towards a strong regional differentiation in the 
living conditions of the population. 
 
4. Factors of vulnerability 
 
Social vulnerability is not equally distributed in Western European countries. Can we identify what 
factors shape this uneven distribution? If social vulnerability is a relatively new phenomenon, is its 
unequal distribution coherent with more traditional forms of social inequality? Is social class a good 
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predictor of social vulnerability? To what extent and how does the welfare state successfully reduce 
the impact of the new social risks on the most vulnerable groups in the population?  What welfare 
regimes seem to perform better in protecting the population against social vulnerability? 
Five types of factors was considered in order to evaluate the factors connected with vulnerability 
levels: 
1. household type 
2. occupational status 
3. education level 
4. GDP per capita at the macro-regional level 
5. welfare-state provision and coverage at the macro-regional level. 
 
The last indicator was introduced to consider the role played by welfare policies in contrasting 
social vulnerability. The spread of the new social risks (Taylor Gooby, 2004) in the past decade has 
required the devising of new welfare programmes, or the reinforcement of previous ones, in order to 
protect the population against the negative impacts of those risks. Little account is taken of these 
programmes in the indexes most commonly used to compare national welfare regimes. Moreover, 
the literature on these aspects has concentrated on the national level in conducting international 
comparisons, so that there are no indexes created to make inter-regional comparisons. 
 
For these reasons, a new index based on a dataset consisting of 28 macro-regions was developed 
considering a number of welfare policy indicators2. In order to understand whether there were one 
or more latent policy dimensions, which frame all the policy measures here considered in the same 
institutional setting, a principal components analysis was performed on these variables. The PCA 
showed that none of these policy instruments can be framed in just one single index: there are two 
components with eigenvalues higher than one. The first of them, called the ‘new social risks 
protection index’ (IPNSR), explained around 44 per cent of the total variance and it mainly 
measured social services coverage (child and elderly care), social housing provision, allowances 
related to poverty, housing, education, and the level of protection of unstable workers. The second 
index, called the ‘traditional risks protection index’ (IPS), explained around 25 per cent of the total 
variance and was more closely related to the level of protection provided by industrial welfare-state 
                                                           
2
 The following indicators were considered: level of child care coverage; level of elderly care coverage; level of 
protection for stable workers (OECD index); level of protection for unstable workers (OECD index); level of coverage 
of potentially poor households; effective parental leave; level of coverage for the unemployed; level of support for 
household education activities; percentage of households with children receiving family benefits; percentage of 
households in rented dwellings that receive housing allowances; percentage of households in social housing among 
those in rented dwellings; old age pension net replacement rate weighted for levels of coverage. 
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institutions such as pensions schemes, unemployment benefit, and stable workers’ protection. This 
result seems to confirm that the level of social programs aimed at reducing the new social risks is 
not correlated with the level of the more traditional welfare programs aimed at reducing risks 
closely related to the loss of stable employment. Not only is there a clear division between old and 
new programs, but also full independence among the levels of such programs (although the 
institutional setting of such measures is organized in accordance with the previous, well-established 
welfare programs, as many analyses have pointed out). Throughout Western Europe, old and new 
social risks receive public responses that are not interdependent in their frequency and intensity.  
 
The aim of the analysis was to identify the main social and political factors contributing to the 
diffusion of social vulnerability in Western European countries. A multilevel regression model was 
estimated by considering two analytical levels: the role of family factors (position in the class 
structure, level of education in the household, household organization) and the role of macro-
regional factors (welfare policy, level of socio-economic development) (see table 2). 
 
The first empirical result of the multilevel regression analysis is that all the variables introduced in 
the model contribute to explaining social vulnerability. The variables at the household level are all 
significant in explaining vulnerability. The results show that the  transformations which have taken 
place in the household organization over the past twenty years have changed the exposure of 
families to social vulnerability. Household organizations that used to be adequately protected by 
traditional welfare states are today among those most likely to be vulnerable. Generally speaking, 
the occurrence of two incomes in the same household is the strongest protective factor against 
social vulnerability: households consisting of two adult workers or two pensioners are adequately 
protected against social risks, while households with only one income (except singles) are the most 
exposed. 
The presence of children in one-income households exacerbates these conditions: one-income 
families with dependent children are therefore likely to become vulnerable. For many decades this 
family organization has been typical in many continental countries (especially the Mediterranean 
and German-speaking ones). According to Crouch (1999), in the second half of the last century the 
stability of Western European societies was built on gender segregation within families and a clear 
separation between domestic work and employment in the labour market. The growth in female 
employment throughout all Western Europe in recent decades has enormously altered this situation, 
although female segregation has not been abolished, but rather shifted from family organization to 
the labour market (where women have lower wages and less stable jobs than men). Our data show 
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that the transition from the classic male breadwinner family model to new dual-income based 
family models has significantly increased the protection of the population against the new social 
risks, while the persistence of the traditional male breadwinner model generates greater exposure to 
social vulnerability. It is therefore the pooling capacity of families that has preserved women from 
incurring disadvantages and risks due to the higher incidence of temporary or low-paid jobs in the 
female labour force. And it is the capacity of families to reconcile work and childcare that enables 
them to acquire a stable position in society. By contrast, social vulnerability is greater in families 
where a work/childcare balance is not achieved and a gendered division persists between domestic 
work and employement in the labour market. 
 
Together with household structure, a second important variable in relation to vulnerability is the 
position of individuals in the social class structure. Firstly, social class matters. Inspection of model 
two in Table 2, when only the household type and the profession are introduced, shows that, if the 
upper service class is used as a reference group, some sort of differentiation takes place in terms of 
social vulnerability: on the one hand the middle class made up by employees seems to be exposed 
to vulnerability no differently from the upper service class; on the other, the two different types of 
working class (skilled and unskilled) and the petite bourgeoisie share a higher exposure to 
vulnerability. Therefore, whether skilled or unskilled, the working class occupies, in relative terms, 
a more vulnerable position in comparison with the service classes. Another interesting finding is the 
relatively higher exposure of the petite bourgeoisie to social vulnerability compared with the rest of 
the middle class, which indicates that at least one section of this class experiences social difficulties. 
 
If we introduce a third variable – the mean household education level – into the regression model, 
the role of social class persists, but with a slight yet significant change. The differentiation among 
classes becomes a polarization between the working class and the service class, with the petite 
bourgeoisie becoming a group not significantly more vulnerable than the service class. The petite 
bourgeoisie seems more vulnerable, not because of its position in the labour market, but because of 
the average lower level of cultural capital of workers belonging to this group. Hence not only the 
social class but also the cultural capital of households plays an important and independent role in 
differentiating exposure to social vulnerability.  
 
At the second level of our analysis, macro-regional differences are considered as factors in social 
vulnerability. Two factors have been introduced into the casual model: welfare policies and regional 
GDP per capita. Territorial variables have greater explanatory capacity than household-level 
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variables as the variance analysis has shown. 38 per cent of total variance is explained by regional 
GDP per capita and eight per cent by welfare policies. As a result, regional differences in Western 
Europe seem to be of great importance for the life chances of the population, and they are possibly 
more crucial than factors related to work or family conditions. Social vulnerability is therefore 
better understood by looking at a map of the macro-regions of Europe than by looking at the 
individual or family-related characteristics of the population.  
 
Two variables have been considered in our model in order to control the effect of macro-regional 
differentiation: the impact of welfare policies on social risks (this variable has been split between 
policies addressing the new social risks and more traditional policies tackling old social risks) and 
the level of regional GDP per capita. To date, a model of interpretation based on the concept of 
welfare regimes has been mostly adopted in international comparative research. In opposition to this 
tradition, our causal model shows the importance of socio-economic structure variables in 
determining social vulnerability with respect to policy variables. Moreover, the influence of GDP 
per capita is only slightly reduced when the effect of welfare policy is introduced into the model. 
This result supports the contention that underlying structural characteristics of macro-regions affect 
the diffusion of social risks throughout Western Europe much more than welfare policy does. GDP 
per capita measures the degree of socio-economic development in a specific area as shown by the 
average level of well-being in the population. In Europe, there are huge differences in living 
standards among macro-regional areas. The impact of welfare policies slightly reduces this regional 
diversity, but it seems unable to generate a real process of convergence in the EU. 
Arguing that territorial structural characteristics account for differences in social vulnerability 
distribution more than welfare state provision does not mean, of course, that the latter has no role in 
exposure to social vulnerability. The data illustrated in model five of Table 2 show that the 
differences in social policy provision across Western Europe help explain, independently of other 
variables, why some households are more vulnerable than others. Two different indicators of 
welfare state protection were introduced in the model: one more related to traditional risks coverage 
(pensions replacement rate, unemployment benefits, regular work protection) and another more 
related to the ‘new’ social risks (care programs, housing benefits, maternal leaves, income 
minimum benefits). The regression analysis presented in Table 2 indicates that both types of 
welfare coverage have significant impacts on the relative diffusion of social vulnerability, but 
especially the latter.  
 
5.  The role of social policies 
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 The onset of social vulnerability is moving onto the agendas of social policy-makers, who are 
developing new social programmes to furnish more targeted protection against new social risks. The 
development of these programmes often comes about in continuity with the traditional intervention 
models, and along institutional paths already established. The level of generosity of the existing 
intervention models notably influence the coverage and the amount of the new programmes, not 
only because the allocation of the public financial resources is closely constrained by the existing 
arrangements, but also because traditional programmes are partly addressed to protect from these 
new social risks. However, the analyses in this paper have highlighted the peculiarity of new 
programmes that are often intended to meet needs under-protected by traditional programmes. The 
European Union is called upon to perform a leading role in this area of innovation. Indeed, our 
research has shown that the strong national and regional characterization of these policies is at odds 
with enormous territorial differences. The geographical distribution of social vulnerability is in fact 
markedly imbalanced along lines which do not correspond to national borders, and even less to the 
boundaries of the different welfare regimes identified by comparative analysis. It is in fact the 
degree of socio-economic development of macro-area, even more than the policies adopted at both 
national and regional level, which influences the extent to which the population is exposed to 
vulnerability. The place where people live matters more than social class. Public policies only 
slightly attenuate this severe territorial inequality, which originates from unequal patterns of 
development. The question arising from this research therefore concerns the future role of the 
European Union. To what extent can a strategy of welfare recalibration (Ferrera and Hemerijck, 
2003) take account of the severe territorial disparities in Western Europe? The future challenge for 
the EU is its capacity to give its citizen more equitable life-opportunities independently from 
economic, social and even territorial backgrounds. The fight against social vulnerability can be 
considered either a problem or an opportunity. In the former case, it points up historical 
shortcomings in the development of national welfare systems; in the latter, it indicates that there is 
space for innovating and recalibrating these systems on the basis of a European agenda. The close 
attention paid to regional differences in this paper emphasises that the supranational role of 
European Union policies should be relaunched. 
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Table 2 Determinants of vulnerability in 27 regions; random intercept model (N=40.648) 
 
   
0M  1M  2M  3M  4M  5M  
   Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E 
  Intercept -0.268 0.092 -0.707 0.104 -1.062 0.094 -0.768 0.079 -0.802 0.080 -0.809 0,084 
Household type                   
Ref.: couple two work incomes 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Single welfare income 
  
 0.400 0.113 0.178 0.147 0.137 0.145 0.156 0.154 0.157 0,157 
  Single work income 
  
 0.134 0.082 0.144 0.069 0.123 0.067 0.132 0.071 0.132 0,072 
  Couple welfare incomes  
  
 -0.148 0.101 -0.194 0.104 -0.224 0.100 -0.226 0.108 -0.228 0,110 
  Couple one income 
  
 0.417 0.096 0.336 0.091 0.294 0.082 0.301 0.093 0.301 0,094 
  Couple with  children <25 one work income 
  
 1.635 0.092 1.637 0.101 1.593 0.101 1.659 0.116 1.665 0,116 
  Couple with  children <25 two work incomes 
  
 0.407 0.085 0.397 0.086 0.400 0.086 0.424 0.094 0.424 0,095 
  One Parent with  children < 25 
  
 
  1.136 0.120 1.039 0.128 0.995 0.130 1.031 0.136 1.034 0,137 
  Couple with  children >25 two work incomes 
  
 0.436 0.069 0.387 0.070 0.380 0.068 0.386 0.071 0.385 0,071 
  One parent with  children > 25 
  
 0.401 0.096 0.342 0.094 0.298 0.094 0.313 0.103 0.311 0,101 
Profession                    
Ref.: Higher grade professionals, administrators, managers 
and large proprietors 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Lower grade professionals,administrators, 
managers and routine non-manual employees 
  
 
  
 0.118 0.089 -0.086 0.069 -0.094 0.072 -0.093 0,073 
  Skilled workers and farmers  
  
 
  
 0.608 0.151 0.285 0.105 0.291 0.108 0.294 0,109 
  Low skilled workers 
  
 
  
 0.658 0.142 0.312 0.100 0.313 0.103 0.317 0,104 
  Petite bourgeoisie   
  
 
  
 0.422 0.129 0.157 0.121 0.155 0.128 0.157 0,129 
Mean household education level (Normalized)          -0.235 0.035 -0.248 0.039 -0.247 0.039 
GPD per capita (Normalized)             -0.379 0.086 -0.290 0.088 
IPNSR (Normalized)                 -0.158 0,055 
IPS (Normalized)                       -0.084 0,041 
Variance  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
Random intercept variance ( 20µσ ) 0,217 0.061 0.190 0.052 0.173 0.050 0.162 0.047 0.079 0.017 0.061 0.014 
% of variance reduction between regions 
  
  12.4   20.3   25.3   63.6   71.9   
